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1 Introduction
In this paper we construct an homotopy between the equilibrium correspon-
dence of an economy with external effects and increasing returns and the
equilibrium correspondence of a standard 2 economy with increasing returns.
This construction allows us to show that the degree of the equilibrium cor-
respondence with externalities is equal to (−1)L−1 where L is the dimension
of the space of goods, and hence to infer existence, finiteness and uniqueness
results. It also allows us to analyze the adaptation of an economy to long term
environmental changes such as climate change.
As emphasized by the title of Starret’s paper (Starret 1972), “Fundamental
non-convexities in the theory of externalities”, external effects and increasing
returns are closely related phenomena, especially when the economy encom-
passes markets of allowances for external effects. Existence of equilibrium in
such a setting has already been studied by (Bonnisseau and Me´decin 2001)
and (Bonnisseau 1997) for general pricing rules, while (Laffont 1978) deals
with the case of profit maximizing producers. Index formula have been es-
tablished in exchange economies with externalities by (Bonnisseau 2003) and
(Del Mercato 2006) but, to our knowledge, these results have never been ex-
tended to production economies and hence there remains an important inde-
terminacy on the structure of the set of equilibria of those economies.
On another hand, the standard treatment of externalities in general equilib-
rium theory as directed phenomena (see (Laffont 1978)) partially lacks gener-
ality to model the major issue that climate change today represents. Indeed,
in this framework an agent can not have an external effect on himself. This
seems to render problematic the satisfaction of the free-disposal assumption
in presence of external effects and probably is not an appropriate model in the
case of climate change, as the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases
increases identically whoever may be the agent who burns fossil fuels.
In order to tackle these issues, we introduce explicitly a concept of environment
which corresponds to the physical framework of the economy. This environ-
ment influences the production and consumption possibilities and may in turn
be influenced by the agent’s choices. When this influence is unilateral (from
the environment to the economy), we can use the results of Jouini for standard
economies (Jouini 1992a), in order to compute the degree of the equilibrium
correspondence for a given environment. From the point of view of interpreta-
tion, this given initial environment is seen as the situation that prevails before
the feedbacks of greenhouse gases emissions on the climate become economi-
cally meaningful (i.e the initial environment under consideration is the current,
2 In the remaining of the paper the standard case is this of an economy with
increasing returns but without external effects.
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or recent past, one).
The influence of the economic activity on the environment is progressively
introduced via an homotopy. The index formula can then be extended to the
framework with external effects provided the economy satisfies a survival as-
sumption for each environment it may face along the way. The main result
of the paper, stated as Theorem 2, hence gives conditions which ensure the
economy can adapt to major environmental changes. Moreover it enables us,
provided a suitable notion of regularity is introduced, to limit the indetermi-
nacy on the equilibria that can be reached.
The general organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present
the general characteristics of the model, introduce the concept of environment
and define the notions of equilibrium for a fixed environment and of equilib-
rium with external effects. In section 3, after having presented the survival
assumptions, we construct the equilibrium correspondences with and with-
out external effects as well as the homotopy between these correspondences.
In section 4 after having applied Jouini’s result to compute the degree with
fixed environment in Theorem 1, we use the homotopy invariance property of
the degree to show, in Theorem 2, that the degree of the equilibrium corre-
spondence with external effects is equal to (−1)L−1, where L is the number
of goods in the economy . We then derive as corrolaries existence results. In
section 5 we state additional regularity and transversality conditions in order
to ensure that the set of equilibria has a manifold structure, so that almost
every economy is regular. This allows us to conclude by stating finiteness and
uniqueness results.
2 The Model
2.1 Agents’ characteristics
We consider an economy with a finite number, m, of consumers indexed by
i = 1 · · ·m and a finite number, n, of producers indexed by j = 1 · · ·n. Those
agents consume, produce and exchange a finite number L of commodities
according to prices p in the simplex of RL. The economy is lying within an
environment whose state is described by a vector of E real parameters e ∈ RE,
and there are reciprocal interactions between the economic activity and the
environment. 3
3 Notations: S = {p ∈ RL+ |
∑L
ℓ=1 pℓ = 1} is the simplex of R
L, S++ denotes its
interior and H the affine space it spans; 1 is the vector ( 1
L
, · · · , 1
L
) ∈ RL. Given
a set Z, int(Z) denotes its interior, clc(Z) its closed and convex closure, A(Z) its
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The production possibilities are described by a correspondence Yj : R
E → RL
which associate to an environment a set of technically feasible production
plans. This correspondence is assumed to satisfy the following conditions :
Assumption (P)
(1) For all j, Yj is a lower semi-continuous correspondence with closed graph;
(2) For all j, for all e ∈ RE, Yj(e)− R
L
+ ⊂ Yj(e);
(3) A

 n∏
j=1
⋃
e∈RE
Yj(e)

⋂

(yj) ∈ (RL)n |
n∑
j=1
yj ≥ 0

 = {0}.
P(1) is a technical regularity assumption on the production correspondences,
P(2) states that firms can freely-dispose of commodities, P(3) will ensure the
boundedness of the set of allocations which are attainable for some environ-
ment. On the other hand, as we want to encompass the possibility of increasing
returns, no convexity assumption is made. We therefore do not set the pro-
ducers’ behavior as profit maximization but use the more general notion of
pricing rule. The pricing behavior of agent j is influenced by the environ-
ment and hence described by a correspondence φj defined on the graph of the
correspondence ∂Yj,
Graph ∂Yj := {(e, yj) ∈ R
E × RL | yj ∈ ∂Yj(e)},
and with values in the L-dimensional simplex S.
This pricing rule defines the producer’s behavior as follows : the price p is
acceptable for firm j given an environment e ∈ RE and a production plan
yj ∈ ∂Yj(e) if p ∈ φj(e, yj). We shall consider pricing rules which satisfy the
following standard requirements:
Assumption (PR)
(1) For all j , φj is an upper semi-continuous, convex and compact valued
correspondence from Graph ∂Yj to S.
(2) For all j, one of the following holds:
• φj has bounded losses (i.e there exists αj ∈ R such that for all (e, yj) ∈
Graph ∂Yj and for all p ∈ φj(e, yj) one has p · yj ≥ αj )
• φj is the marginal pricing rule ( i.e for all (e, yj) ∈ Graph ∂Yj, φj(e, yj) =
NYj(e)(yj)
⋂
S.)
Note that profit maximizing behavior is encompassed in this setting when the
Yj have convex values and the elements of φj(e, yj) are normal vectors to Yj(e)
at yj.
asymptotic cone and NZ(z) its Clarke’s normal cone in z.
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The consumers’ wealth comes from an initial endowment ωi ∈ R
L
+ and from
shares of firm’s profits or losses they receive according to the revenue func-
tions ri(p, (yj)) defined on S× (R
L)n. This wealth does not depend directly on
the environment. However consumers’ well-being depends on the state of the
environment e ∈ RE as well as on their consumption of a bundle of commodi-
ties xi in R
L
+. It is measured by an utility function ui defined on R
E × RL+.
Consumers’ characteristics are assumed to satisfy the following conditions :
Assumption (C) For all i:
(1) ui is continuous;
(2) For all e ∈ RE, ui(e, ·) is quasi-concave;
(3) For all e ∈ RE, ui(e, ·) is strictly monotone with regards to commodities:
∀xi ∈ R
L
+, ∀ξ ∈ R
L
+/{0}, ui(e, xi) < ui(e, xi + ξ);
(4) ri is continuous and for all (p, (yj)) ∈ S × (R
L)n, one has∑m
i=1 ri(p, (yj)) = p ·
∑n
j=1 yj.
Under assumption C, we can sum up the behavior of the consumers by a
demand correspondence:
Definition 1 The demand of agent i,
Di : R
E × S++ × R++ → R
L
+,
is the correspondence which associates to an environment e ∈ RE, a price
p ∈ S++, and a wealth w > 0, the set of elements xi ∈ R
L
+ which maximize
ui(e, ·) in the budget set B(p, w) = {xi ∈ R
L
+ | p · xi ≤ w}.
This demand correspondence satisfies the following standard conditions :
Lemma 1 Under assumption C
(1) Di is an upper semi-continuous correspondence with non-empty convex
compact values.
(2) For every (e, p, w) ∈ RE × S++ × R++, and every xi ∈ Di(e, p, w), one
has p · xi = w
(3) For every e ∈ RE, if (pn, wn) is a sequence in S++ × R
L
++ converging to
(p, w) such that w > 0 and p 6∈ S++ then 1 ·Di(e, pn, wn)→ +∞
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2.2 Definition of equilibria
When an environment e0 ∈ R
E is given, we can define an economic equilibrium
of E(ω) 4 as:
Definition 2 (Equilibrium for a fixed environment) An equilibrium of
E(ω) for the environment e0 is an element (p, (xi), (yj)) ∈ S++×(R
L
+)
m×(RL)n
such that:
(1) For all i, xi ∈ Di(e0, p, p · ωi + ri(p, (yj));
(2) For all j, yj ∈ ∂Yj(e0) and p ∈ φj(e0, yj);
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi.
Such an equilibrium corresponds to a situation where there is no feedback
of the economic activity on the environment. In the framework of long term
environmental changes, such as climate change, it should be considered as the
situation which prevails before the environmental consequences of economic
activity have entered the economic timeframe.
From a more technical point of view, this definition coincide with this of an
equilibrium without external effects, see e.g (Bonnisseau and Cornet 1988 ),
which would be parametrized by the exogenously given environmental param-
eter e0.
We then consider the effects of the economic activity on the environment
become progressively observable and economically meaningful. At some point,
they become relevant for the determination of the agents’ economic choices.
In order to represent the emergence of these feedbacks, we introduce a contin-
uous environmental function
ξ : (RL)m+n → RE
which continuously associate 5 to a vector of consumption plans (xi) ∈ (R
L
+)
m
and production plans (yj) ∈
∏n
j=1
⋃
e∈RE Yj(e), the resulting state of the envi-
ronment ξ((xi), (yj)).
Remark 1 The standard treatment of externalities a` la (Laffont 1978) is
encompassed in our framework when ξ is the identity function on (RL)m+n
and when the influence of the environment on an agent characteristics only
4 We denote by E(ω) the economy where the consumer’s initial endowments are set
equal to ω = (ωi)i=1···m ∈ (R
L
+)
m
5 The function is arbitrarily extended to (RL)m+n for sake of technical simplicity.
However, we shall use an interpretation only when the (xi), (yj) correspond to actual
agents’ choices.
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depends on the parameters corresponding to the other agents choices (see
(Bonnisseau and Me´decin 2001)). Hence in the standard setting, the environ-
mental consequences of one agent choices on himself are a priori internalized.
It seems to us, this a priori internalization renders problematic the satisfaction
of the free-disposal assumption : an agent might not dispose of an input/output
whose use causes him external effects without seeing its production possibili-
ties change (see the example in the appendix). Moreover, this framework does
not seem appropriate to analyze global environmental externalities such as cli-
mate change where the arm caused by the pollution is totally independent of
its source.
We then define a notion of equilibrium with external effects where the eco-
environmental feedbacks are taken into consideration:
Definition 3 (Equilibrium with external effects) An equilibrium with ex-
ternal effects of E(ω) is an element (p, (xi), (yj)) ∈ S++× (R
L
+)
m× (RL)n such
that:
(1) For all i, xi ∈ Di(e, p, p · ωi + ri(p, (yj));
(2) For all j, yj ∈ ∂Yj(e) and p ∈ φj(e, yj);
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi;
with e = ξ((xi), (yj))
In the following, we shall take as a reference point an equilibrium with fixed
environment and try to characterize if and how the economy can reach an
equilibrium with external effects. More precisely, we will use the index formula
for production economies given in (Jouini 1992a) in order to obtain an index
formula for equilibria with fixed environment and will then determine which
additional conditions ensure that a similar index formula hold for equilibria
with external effects. This result will first be used to discuss how the existence
of an equilibrium with external effects can be inferred from the existence
of an equilibrium with fixed environment. Second, we will try to quantify
the indeterminacy on the equilibrium with external effects which is reached
after the environmental feedbacks have appeared. Hence we tend to provide a
general equilibrium analysis of the conditions under which the economy can
adapt to long term environmental changes.
3 Characterization of Equilibria
In this section, we set up an algebraic framework for the analysis of the equi-
libria of E(ω) by characterizing them as zeroes of upper-semi-continuous cor-
respondences. In order to construct this framework we shall first define a do-
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main for the correspondences which is appropriate in terms of mathematical
regularity and also meaningful from the economic point of view (the latter is
mainly achieved via the use of the survival assumptions introduced below). On
another hand, we will need to adjust the representations of the agent’s behav-
ior at the margin of this domain and will therefore introduce some auxiliary
contructions.
3.1 Definition of the domain
We first present two technical remarks which will prove useful to represent the
producer’s behavior :
• Using the fact that the consumption sets are bounded below and assumption
P (3), it is standard to show that there exists a compact ball of RL, K, such
that the allocations attainable for some environment,
{((xi), (yj)) ∈
m∏
i=1
R
L
+ ×
n∏
j=1
⋃
e∈RE
Yj(e) |
n∑
j=1
yj +
m∑
i=1
ωi =
m∑
i=1
xi}
lie in the interior of Km+n. Due to the continuity of ξ, there then exists a
compact ball KE of R
E, such that ξ(Km+n) ⊂ KE.
• According to Lemma 5 in (Bonnisseau and Cornet 1988 ) , assumption P (ii)
implies that for all e ∈ RE the restriction of proj1⊥ to ∂Yj(e) is an homeo-
morphism. Its inverse Λj(e, ·) is obtained by associating to an element of 1
⊥
the element of ∂Yj(e) reached
6 by moving along the direction given by 1.
Hence, one can define a mapping Λj : R
E × 1⊥ →
⋃
e∈RE ∂Yj(e). This map-
ping is continuous according to Lemma 3.1 in (Bonnisseau 1997). It allows
us to endow each ∂Yj(e) with the manifold structure defined by 1
⊥.
We then define the set
U = {(p, (sj), (ωi), e) ∈ S++ × (1
⊥)n × RLm × int(KE) |
p · (
n∑
j=1
Λj(e, sj) +
m∑
i=1
ωi) > 0}.
This set is an open subset of H× (1⊥)n ×RLm ×RE and hence an orientable
manifold 7 . It will serve as a domain for the equilibrium correspondence. The
choice of U as domain is motivated by the fact that behavior of consumers
can be meaningfully defined only for a non-negative wealth (what imposes the
6 there exists such an element thanks to the free-disposal assumption.
7 In the following, we consider the canonical orientation such that deg(Id, U) = 1,
see appendix for further details on the degree.
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restriction of the domain to U), while the mathematical analysis requires a
sufficiently structured set to elaborate upon, in our framework an orientable
manifold (what imposes the extension of the domain to U) .
3.2 Survival and Revenue assumptions
As is standard in the general equilibrium literature with increasing returns
(see (Bonnisseau 1997), (Bonnisseau and Me´decin 2001), (Jouini 1992a) and
(Jouini 1992b)), survival assumptions will play a crucial role in our analysis.
From the economic point of view, survival assumptions ensure that the econ-
omy can produce a positive wealth in a sufficiently large range of situations.
From the mathematical point of view, they allow together with the property
(3) of the demand that a tangential condition holds for the equilibrium corre-
spondence.
Remark 2 The simplest form of survival assumption is the interiority of
initial endowments in a pure exchange economy. In presence of increasing
returns, the survival assumption must encompass the possibility of losses in
the production sector and hence is of the form, for every (p, (yj), ω
′) ∈ W,
p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω
′) > 0, where p stands for the market price, yj the production
of firm j and ω′ a vector of initial ressources for the economy. The restriction
the assumption imposes on the primitives of the economy may be measured by
the size of the set W on which one requires it to hold.
We will base our arguments on the following version of the survival assumption,
which ensures the viability of the economic process for a given environment:
Assumption (SA(e, ω)) For all (p, (yj)) ∈ S ×
∏n
j=1 Yj(e) such that
p ∈
⋂
j φj(yj, e) and
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi ≥ 0, one has
p · (
n∑
j=1
yj +
m∑
i=1
ωi) > 0.
This assumption simply consists in a parametrization by the environment of
the standard version of the survival assumption (see e.g (Jouini 1992a)). In the
following we shall first assume that for a reference (the initial) environment,
assumption SA(e0, ω
′) holds for every ω′ ≥ ω, this will ensure the existence
of an equilibrium for the fixed environment e0. We will then show that the
satisfaction of assumption SA(e, ω) for every environment e ∈ KE suffice to
extend the existence result to equilibrium with external effects.
An alternative used in (Bonnisseau and Me´decin 2001) to prove directly the
existence of an equilibrium with external effects is to posit that the survival as-
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sumption holds for the environment actually determined by the agents’ choices
and for every ω′ ≥ ω. Our condition are no weaker than theirs nor is the con-
verse true. However our approach allows to expressly compare the sufficient
conditions for the existence of equilibrium with and without external effects,
more precisely to underline which additional conditions are needed to ensure
the existence of equilibrium with external effects, when the existence of an
equilibrium with fixed environment is guaranteed. This approach seems to us
appropriate as one aims at modeling the influence on the economic equilib-
rium of the emergence of environmental feedbacks. Moreover from an empirical
point of view, considering for example an observer or a decision maker who
has to forecast the economic evolution for various climate change scenarios,
it seems much easier to check that, for a certain range of environmental con-
ditions, the survival assumption holds than to compute the exact correlation
between the economic activity and the environment and then check that the
condition holds.
We finally introduce a revenue assumption at the individual level in order to
ensure that the working of the economy provides a positive wealth to every
agent:
Assumption (R(e, ω)) For all (p, (xi), (yj)) ∈ S ×
∏m
i=1(R
L
+) ×
∏n
j=1 Yj(e)
such that p ∈
⋂
j φj(yj, e)
⋂
S++ and
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi ≥ 0, one has
p · ωi + ri(p, (yj)) > 0.
The range of the assumptions R(e, ω) covers any potential equilibrium but not
the whole of U. In order to be able to define consumer’s behavior inside this
gap, we borrow the idea of Lemma 2 in (Jouini 1992a), and define on
U ′ = {(p, (yj), (ωi)) ∈ S×
∏n
j=1
⋃
e∈RE ∂Yj(e)×(R
L
+)
m | p·(
∑n
j=1 yj+
∑m
i=1 ωi) > 0}
the following auxiliary income functions:
Lemma 2 There exist continuous mappings
r˜i : U
′ → R
such that:
(1) For (p, (yj), (ωi)) ∈ U
′, one has r˜i(p, (yj), (ωi)) + p · ωi > 0 for all i;
(2) For (p, (yj), (ωi)) ∈ U
′ such that for all i p · ωi + ri(p, (yj)) > 0, one has
ri(p, (yj)) = r˜i(p, (yj), (ωi)) for all i;
(3) For (p, (yj), (ωi)) ∈ U
′, one has
∑m
i=1 r˜i(p, (yj), (ωi)) = p ·
∑n
j=1 yj.
Proof: It suffices to set following (Jouini 1992a), for (p, (yj), (ωi)) ∈ U
′,
r˜i(p, (yj), (ωi)) := (1− θ(ρ))
∑m
i=1 ρi
m
+ θ(ρ)ρi − p · ωi
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where,
• ρ = (ρi) = p · ωi + ri(p, (yj))
• θ(ρ) =


1, if for all i ρi > 0
∑m
i=1
ρi∑m
i=1
ρi−m infk ρk
, otherwise
In the following we will summarize consumer i behavior by the demand with
auxiliary income which we shall denote, for sake of simplicity, by
Di(e, p, (sj), (ωi)) instead of Di(e, p, r˜i(p,Λj(e, sj), (ωi))+p ·ωi). This mapping
is well-defined and upper semi-continuous with compact and convex values on
U .
3.3 Equilibrium Correspondence
In order to study their relationships we have to encompass the equilibria with
a fixed environment and the equilibria with external effects in related algebraic
structures. Therefore, given an environment e0 ∈ KE we define the family of
correspondences:
F e0t : U → H× (1
⊥)n × RLm × RE
by F e0t (p, (sj), (ωi), e) =


projH(
∑m
i=1 Di(e, p, (sj), (ωi))−
∑n
j=1 Λj(e, sj))−
∑m
i=1 ωi),
(φj(e,Λj(e, sj))− p),
(wi),
e− projKE [tξ(Di(e, p, (sj), (ωi)),Λj(e, sj)) + (1− t)e0)]


Those correspondences are upper semi-continuous, have compact and convex
values, compact (pointwise) inverse image, and their domain and codomain
are orientable manifolds of the same dimension. Hence they fit into the frame-
work of Cellina’s degree theory presented in the appendix. Moreover, they
characterize the equilibria of E(ω) in the sense of the following propositions:
Proposition 1 Assume assumption R(e0, ω) holds.
One has (p, (sj), ω, e) ∈ (F
e0
0 )
−1(1, 0, ω, 0) if and only if there exists
xi ∈ Di(e, p, (sj), (ωi)) such that (p, (xi), (Λj(e, sj)))) is an equilibrium of E(ω)
for the fixed environment e0.
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Proposition 2 Assume assumption R(e, ω) holds for all e ∈ KE.
One has (p, (sj), ω, e) ∈ (F
e0
1 )
−1(1, 0, ω, 0) if and only if there exists
xi ∈ Di(e, p, (sj), (ωi)) such that (p, (xi), (Λj(e, sj)))) is an equilibrium with
external effects of E(ω).
Proposition 3 Assume assumption R(e, ω) holds for all e ∈ KE.
One has (p, (sj), ω, e) ∈ F
−1
t (e, 0, ω, 0, 0) if and only if there exists an environ-
ment e′ ∈ KE and xi ∈ Di(e, p, (sj), (ωi)) such that (p, (xi), (Λj(e, sj)))) is an
equilibrium of E(ω) for the fixed environment e′.
Proof: (of proposition 1)
Let (p, (sj), ω, e) ∈ (F
e0
0 )
−1(1, 0, ω, 0). First of all, it is clear as e0 ∈ KE
that e = e0. Let us then set yj = Λj(e0, sj)) and choose an element xi ∈
Di(e0, p, (sj), (ωi)), such that
projH(xi −
n∑
j=1
yj −
m∑
i=1
ωi) = 1.
Using Walras law (property 2 of Lemma 1), one then has
∑m
i=1 xi−
∑n
j=1 yj =
ω ≥ 0.
Hence, the xi are attainable for the environment e0 ∈ KE and lie in a com-
pact set, what implies using property 3 of lemma 1 that p ∈ S++. Moreover,
it is clear that one has for all j, p ∈ φj(e0, yj). One can then use assump-
tion R(e0, ω), in order to ensure that the auxiliary incomes coincide with the
original ones.
This suffices to prove that (p, (xi), (yj)) is an equilibrium of E(ω) for the fixed
environment e0.
The converse is straightforward.
Proof: (of proposition 2)
Let (p, (sj), ω, e) ∈ (F
e0
0 )
−1(1, 0, ω, 0). Let us set yj = Λj(e, sj)) and choose an
element xi ∈ Di(e, p, (sj), (ωi)), such that
projH(xi −
n∑
j=1
yj −
m∑
i=1
ωi) = 1
and
e− projKEξ((xi)(yj)) = 0.
Using Walras law, it is clear that
∑m
i=1 xi −
∑n
j=1 yj = ω ≥ 0, and hence that
((xi), (yj)) is an attainable allocation for the environment e. It follows that
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ξ((xi), (yj)) ∈ KE and therefore e = ξ((xi), (yj)) : the compatibility constraints
between the economic activity and the environment are satisfied.
The remaining of the proof proceeds as in the case of proposition 1 except that
one uses the fact that e ∈ KE and that R(e
′, ω) holds true for every e′ in KE
in order to show that the auxiliary incomes coincide with the original ones.
The proof of proposition 3 follows from the same arguments.
4 Index Formula
4.1 Equilibria for a fixed environment
We first establish an index formula for equilibria with a fixed environment
e0 ∈ int(KE). This fixed environment and the corresponding equilibria, whose
existence is implied by the index formula, should be thought of as the situation
which prevails before major environmental feedbacks have appeared. Taking as
example the emergence of climate change impacts, the reference environment
corresponds to the current (or recent past) situation where the effects on the
temperature of the intensive use of fossil fuels are not significant from an
economic point of view.
From the mathematical point of view, as mentioned above, the corresponding
concept of equilibrium with fixed environment simply is a parametrized version
of the standard one. It is therefore not surprising that the index formula
established in (Jouini 1992a) can easily be generalized to this framework.
Theorem 1 Assume assumptions (P ), (PR), (C), R(e0, ω) and for all
ω′ ≥ ω, SA(e0, ω
′), hold. The degree of F e00 at (e, 0, ω, 0, 0) is equal to (−1)
L−1.
Corollary 1 There exist equilibria for a fixed environment in the economy
E(ω).
Proof: (of the corollary) This is a straightforward consequence of the prop-
erty of non-triviality of the degree (see appendix).
Proof: (of the theorem) Using Theorem 5.1 in (Jouini 1992a) and its ex-
tensions in (Jouini 1992b) (see also (Bonnisseau 1992)), it is straightforward
that in the cases where for all j, the pricing rules φj(e0, .) have bounded losses
or coincide with the marginal pricing rule, the correspondence
Ge0 : V → H× (1⊥)n × RLm
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defined on
V := {(p, (sj), (ωi)) ∈ S++ × (1
⊥)n × RLm | p · (
n∑
j=1
Λj(e0, sj) +
m∑
i=1
ωi) > 0}
Ge0(p, (sj), (ωi)) =


projH(
∑m
i=1 Di(e0, p, (sj), (ωi))−
∑n
j=1 Λj(e0, sj)−
∑m
i=1 ωi),
(φj(e0,Λj(e0, sj))− p),
(wi).


has degree (−1)L−1.
Now, the family of correspondences (Ht)t∈[0,1] defined on V × int(K
m+n
E ) by
Ht : t→ t((G
e0 , 0) + (1− t)F e00
is, using the invariance by homotopy property of the degree, preserving the
degree in (1, 0, ω, 0) as all its relevant zeroes are in fact equilibria for the fixed
environment e0 and hence all lie in a compact set of V × int(K
m+n
E ). This
ends the proof.
4.2 Equilibria with external effects
We now focus on the situation where feedbacks between the economic activity
and the environment emerge 8 . Starting from the existence of equilibria for
the reference environment e0 ∈ KE, we can infer existence of equilibria with
external effects, and even show that the degree of the equilibrium correspon-
dence is preserved, provided that the survival assumption is satisfied along
the path defined by the homotopy Ft, that is provided the economy is able
to maintain a positive wealth creation as the feedbacks from the environment
emerge.
Namely, we have:
Theorem 2 Assume the necessary conditions of theorem 1 hold and that
moreover SA(e, ω) hold for all e ∈ KE. One then has for all t ∈ [0, 1] :
deg(F e0t , (1, 0, ω, 0)) = (−1)
L−1
8 Still focusing on the example of climate change this should corresponds to the
situation at the horizon 2050-2100.
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Proof: For sake of simplicity, we denote FE0t by Ft in the course of the
proof. We then show that the degree is preserved between F0 and F1. To ac-
tually prove invariance by homotopy of the degree, it suffices to show that⋃
τ∈[0,1] F
−1
t (e, 0, ω, 0, 0) is compact in U (see appendix for further details).
Let us then consider a sequence (pn, (snj ), ω, en) ∈
⋃
τ∈[0,1] F
−1
τ (e, 0, ω, 0, 0) and
show it has a converging subsequence with limit in U.
For all n there exist tn such that (1, 0, ω, 0) ∈ Ftn(p
n, (snj ), ω, en). Let us then
set ynj = Λj(e
n, snj )) and choose an element x
n
i ∈ Di(e
n, pn, (snj ), ω), such that
projH(x
n
i −
n∑
j=1
ynj −
m∑
i=1
ωi) = 1
and
en − projKE(tnξ((x
n
i ), (y
n
j )) + (1− tn)e0) = 0.
Using Walras law, one has
∑m
i=1 x
n
i −
∑n
j=1 y
n
j = ω ≥ 0.
This implies ((xni ), (y
n
j )) is an attainable allocation for the environment en and
hence belongs to the compact set Km+n.
Due to the continuity of the projection on 1⊥ and the compacity of Km+n, this
implies that for all j, snj lie in a compact set.
Also, it is clear that en ∈ KE.
Finally as φj has values in S, one has p
n ∈ S.
To sum up, (pn, (snj ), ω, e
n, (xni ), (y
n
j )t
n) belongs to the compact set S×(1⊥)n×
R
Lm×KE ×K
m+n× [0, 1] and hence has a subsequence converging inside this
set. Let us denote by (p, (sj), (ωi), e, (xi), (yj), t) its limit. It remains to show
that (p, (sj), (ωi), e) is in U .
It is clear by continuity that yj = Λj(e, sj), xi ∈ Di(e, p, (sj), ω) and that∑m
i=1 xi −
∑n
j=1 yj = ω ≥ 0.
This first implies that ((xi), (yj)) ∈ K
m+n, and hence that ξ((xi), (yj)) belongs
to the interior of KE. It is also the case that e0 ∈ int(KE) by assumption.
Now, one has by continuity that e = projKE(tξ((xi), (yj)) + (1− t)e0), so that
the preceding implies e ∈ int(KE).
Second, continuity properties of φj imply that p ∈ φj(e, yj). As moreover∑n
j=1 yj+
∑m
i=1 ωi ≥ 0 and e belongs to the interior of KE, the survival assump-
tion SA(e, ω) implies that p·(yj+
∑m
i=1 wi) > 0 and therefore r˜i(p,Λj(Et, sj), ωi)+
p · ωi > 0. Given the fact that (xi) is bounded, the boundary condition (3) in
Lemma 1 then implies that p ∈ S++. This ends the proof.
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Using the property of non-triviality of the degree, Theorem 2 provides a serie
of existence results for equilibria with external effects :
Corollary 2 Under the assumptions 9 of Theorem 2, there exists an equilib-
rium in the economy. E(ω).
In particular, one has for loss free pricing rules for which the survival as-
sumptions are satisfied as soon as the initial endowments satisfy an interiority
condition:
Corollary 3 Under assumptions (P ), (PR), (C), if for all i ωi ∈ R
L
++ and if
the pricing rules are loss-free, there exists an equilibrium with external effects
in the economy E(ω).
This encompasses the case of competitive behavior:
Corollary 4 Under assumptions (P ) and (C), if for all i (ωi) ∈ R
L
++ and if
for all j the production correspondences have convex values containing 0 while
the producers maximize their profit, there exists an equilibrium with external
effects in the economy E(ω).
Proof: Indeed, in this framework, the pricing rule coincide with the restric-
tion to S of the normal cone of convex analysis and satisfy all the properties
required by theorem 2, (in particular assumption PR)
Finally, one should note that from the non-nullity of the degree of the cor-
respondences Ft for t ∈]0, 1[ one can infer the existence of equilibria of E(ω)
for undetermined environment in KE corresponding to situations where the
environmental effects are only partially taken into account. Even-tough those
equilibria are not of a tremendous interest per se, their existence can be seen
as indicating the possibility of a transition between an equilibrium with a fixed
environment and an equilibrium with external effects through an equilibrium
path. Such transitions will be further studied in the following section.
9 One should have in mind that according to (Bonnisseau and Me´decin 2001) in
the case of marginal pricing , Clarke’s normal cone does not necessarily satisfy the
first condition of assumption (PR) because its graph may not be closed.Sufficient
conditions for the marginal pricing rule to satisfy the assumption (PR) is that Yj has
convex values or that an additional smoothness requirement hold (see assumption
(PS) in (Bonnisseau and Me´decin 2001)).
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5 Regular Economies and the Equilibrium Manifold
In order to fully exploit the preceding results : use the index formula to actually
count the number of equilibria or study the sensitivity of the equilibria to
environmental feedbacks, we need to gain further insight on the structure of
the set of equilibria.
Therefore, we aim at extending the results of (Jouini 1992C) to our framework.
We shall in the following assume that the necessary assumptions of Theorem 2
hold and moreover that ξ, (φj)j=1···n, (Di)i=1··· and (ri)i=1···m are C
k functions
for some k ≥ 1.
Additionally, we introduce a first transversality condition on the pricing rules
which is the equivalent of assumption TR of (Jouini 1992C):
Assumption (TR1) For every (e, (yj), p) ∈ KE ×
∏n
j=1 Yj × S++ such that
p ∈
⋂
j φj(e, yj), the matrix


∂φ1(e,y1)
∂y1
0 . . . 0 −IL−1
0
. . . . . .
...
...
...
. . . . . . 0
...
0 . . . 0 ∂φn(e,yn)
∂yn
−IL−1


has rank n(L− 1)
This assumption ensures that the pricing rules do not have “too many ” com-
mon critical values and amounts to assume that 0 ∈ Hn is a regular value of
the mapping defined on H× (1⊥)n × RE and with values in Hn :
(p, (yj), e)→ (φj(e,Λj(e, sj))− p)j=1···n.
According to Sard’s Lemma, almost every value of this mapping is regular,
so that assumption TR1 is always satisfied modulo an ǫ-perturbation of the
pricing rules (see (Jouini 1992C)).
Under this assumption, the set of equilibria with an environment in int(KE)
has a manifold structure:
Proposition 4 Under assumptions TR, the set of equilibria with a fixed en-
vironment in int(KE) is a C
k submanifold of H × (1⊥)n × RLm × RE with
dimension mL+ E.
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Proof: It is a straightforward extension of proposition 3.1 in (Jouini 1992C)
that under assumption (TR1) the Ck mapping H with values in H × (1⊥)n
and defined on U by H(p, (sj), (ωi), e) =

 projH(
∑m
i=1 Di(e, p, r˜i(p,Λj(e, sj), (ωi)) + p · ωi)−
∑n
j=1 Λj(e, sj)−
∑m
i=1 ωi),
(φj(e,Λj(e, sj))− p).


is a submersion in (0, 0).
Hence G−1(0, 0), which is exactly the set of equilibria for a fixed environment
in int KE is a submanifold of dimension mL + E of H× (1
⊥)n × RLm × RE
(as this set is non-empty according to the results of the preceding section).
The remaining results of (Jouini 1992C), in particular proposition 4.4, could
then easily be extended to our framework, in order to show that in the neigh-
borhood of almost every (ω, e), there is a finite parametrization of the equilib-
rium set by Ck functions depending on the initial endowment and the environ-
ment. Therefore, there is a strong confidence that the economy can react to a
change of its environment without too brusque transitions before it reaches ,
after the feedbacks between the economic activity and the environment have
been completly established, an equilibria with external effects.
There may however be a large indeterminacy on the equilibrium with external
effects reached ; for example up to now nothing prevents the existence of an
infinite number of equilibria with external effects.
Part of this indeterminacy can be lifted using the index formula established in
Theorem 2. Indeed, let us call regular the economy E(ω) whenever (1, 0, ω, 0)
is a regular value of F e01
10 . It is then a direct application of the degree theory
of Ck functions on finite dimensional open sets that for a regular economy
E(ω),
deg(F e01 , (1, 0, ω, 0)) =
∑
(p,(sj),ω,e)∈(F
e0
1
)−1(1,0,ω,0)
I(p,(sj),ω,e)
where I(p,(sj),ω,e) the index of the “equilibrium” (p, (sj), ω, e) is equal to the sign
of the determinant of the differential of F e01 at (p, (sj), ω, e). This immediately
implies, using Theorem 2, that:
Proposition 5 If E(ω) is regular, than it has an odd number of equilibria.
Moreover, if the index is constant over the set of equilibria, E(ω) has an unique
equilibrium.
10 i.e the differential of F e01 is invertible at every point of (F
e0
1 )
−1(1, 0, ω, 0).
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This result is however useful only if one can ensure that a large number of
economies are regular. This is what we now aim at proving.
Therefore, one requires that a second transversality condition holds :
Assumption (TR2) For every (e, (yj), p) ∈ KE ×
∏n
j=1 Yj × S++ such that
there exists ω ∈ (RL+)
m with H(p, (sj), ω, e) = 0
11 the matrix
IE −
(
∂ξ
∂x1
, · · · ,
∂ξ
∂xm
,
∂ξ
∂y1
, · · · ,
∂ξ
∂yn
)(
∂D1
∂e
, · · · ,
∂Dm
∂e
,
∂Λ1
∂e
, · · · ,
∂Λn
∂e
)T
has full rank.
This condition on the differential of e → e− ξ(Di(e, p, (sj), (ωi)),Λj(e, sj)) is
always satisfied modulo a small perturbation of the environmental function
(a direct application of Sard’s lemma as in (Jouini 1992C)). It states that
a local change in the state of the environment does not provoke changes in
the agent’s consumption and production which would in turn entail the exact
same changes in the state of the environment . Finally, it allows us to ensure
that the set of equilibria with external effects also has a manifold structure:
Proposition 6 Under assumptions TR1 and TR2 the set of equilibria with
external effects is a Ck submanifold of dimension mL.
Proof: It is a direct extension of proposition 4 that under assumption (TR1)
and TR2 the Ck mapping J with values in H× (1⊥)n ×RE and defined on U
by J(p, (sj), (ωi), e) =


projH(
∑m
i=1 Di(e, p, r˜i(p,Λj(e, sj), (ωi)) + p · ωi)−
∑n
j=1 Λj(e, sj)−
∑m
i=1 ωi),
(φj(e,Λj(e, sj))− p)
e− ξ(Di(e, p, (sj), (ωi)),Λj(e, sj))


is a submersion in (0, 0, 0).
Hence J−1(0, 0), which is exactly the set of equilibria with external effects is a
submanifold of dimension mL of H× (1⊥)n × RLm × RE (as it is non-empty
according to the results of the preceding section).
One can then apply Sard’s lemma in order to show that the projection from
the manifold of equilibrium with external effects onto the space of initial al-
locations (RL+)
m is almost everywhere regular, what implies that for almost
every ω ∈ (RL+)
m, the economy E(ω) is regular. Hence Proposition 5 generically
applies.
11 i.e (e, (yj), p), entails an equilibrium for some ω.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Degree theory (mostly taken from (Jouini 1992a))
The degree theory of upper-semi-continuous correspondences developped in
(Granas 1959) and (Cellina and Lasota 1969) is an extension of the topolog-
ical degree theory. Given an upper-semi-continuous correspondence F with
convex and compact values, there exists for every ǫ > 0, a continuous func-
tion fǫ whose graph is contained in an ǫ-neighborhood of the graph of F.
Approximating fǫ by a smooth function, one can define the degree of F
as the degree of those smooth approximations for ǫ sufficiently small ( see
(Cellina and Lasota 1969), (Giraud 2001)). More precisely, one obtains the
following axiomatic characterization.
Given the set C of (F,X, Y, y) where:
(1) X and Y are two oriented manifolds of the same dimension contained in
an euclidian space;
(2) F : X → Y is an upper semi-continuous correspondence with nonempty
convex compact values,;
(3) y ∈ Y and F−1(y) := {x ∈ X | y ∈ F (x)} is a compact subset of X.
Theorem 3 There exists a unique function, called degree, deg : C → Z such
that:
(1) (Normalization) deg(Id, Y, Y, y) = 1
(2) (Localization) If F−1(y) ⊂ U and F (U) ⊂ V where U and V are open
subsets of X and Y respectively, then:
deg(F,X, Y, y) = deg(F|U , U, V, y)
(3) (Additivity) If (Gi)i=1···n is a finite partition of X by open sets such that
for all i, (F|Gi , Gi, Y, y) ∈ C, then
deg(F,X, Y, y) =
n∑
i=1
deg(F|Gi , Gi, Y, y)
(4) (Invariance by homotopy) If (Ft, X, Y, y)is a family of elements of C such
that for every compact subset K of X the mapping t→ GraphFt
⋂
(K×Y )
is continuous with regard to the Hausdorff’s distance on K×Y and such
that
⋃
t∈[0,1] F
−1
t (y) is a compact subset of X, then:
deg(F0, X, Y, y) = deg(F1, X, Y, y)
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(5) (Continuity)If there exists a compact neighborhood, K of y∗ such that
F−1(K) := {x ∈ X | F (x)
⋂
K 6= ∅} is compact, then deg(F,X, Y, y) is
constant on K.
(6) (Chain Rule) If (F,X, Y, y) and (G, Y, Z, z) are two elements of C such
that Y is connected and for every compact K of Y, F−1(K) is compact,
then
deg(G ◦ F,X,Z, z) = deg(F,X, Y, y) · deg(G, Y, Z, z)
where for all x G ◦ F (x) := clc(
⋃
y∈F (x) G(y))
(7) (Non-triviality) If deg(F,X, Y, y) 6= 0 then F−1(y) 6= 0.
6.2 Externalities and free-disposability
To illustrate the point made in Remark 1, let us consider two firms operating
on two goods. A production plan of the first firm being denoted by (x1, x2) ∈
R
2 and one of the second firm being denoted by (y1, y2) ∈ R
2. Consider a
situations where both producers are affected by the level of a certain pollutant
e ∈ R. For example, one can consider that production possibilities are given
by the same production correspondence for the two firms :
Y (e) = {(z1, z2) | z2 ≤ min(−z1, 1− e) and z1 ≤ 0}.
For such a representation of the production possibilities, which is the one
used in the paper, the free-disposal assumption is satisfied independently of
the correlations between the pollution and the production process.
Now, consider that the level of pollution is determined by the total use of good
1 in the economy. For example that when the production plans are (x1, x2) and
(y1, y2) respectively, the total level of pollution is −x1 − y1. In our framework
this simply means that the environmental function is
ξ : ((x1, x2), (y1, y2))→ −x1 − y1
However, if one then wants to write the production correspondence in the
framework of (Laffont 1978), one should write :
Y1((y1, y2)) = {(x1, x2) | x2 ≤ min(−x1, 1 + x1 + y1) and x1 ≤ 0}.
Y2((x1, x2)) = {(y1, y2) | y2 ≤ min(−y1, 1 + y1 + x1) and y1 ≤ 0}.
In this setting ,the free-disposability assumption is no longer satisfied.
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